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Do biomedical models of illness make for good healthcare
systems?
Derick T Wade, Peter W Halligan
Current medical models assume that all illness is secondary to disease. Revision is needed to explain
illnesses without disease and improve organisation of health care
Cultural and professional models of illness influence
decisions on individual patients and delivery of health
care. The biomedical model of illness, which has domi-
nated health care for the past century, cannot fully
explain many forms of illness. This failure stems partly
from three assumptions: all illness has a single
underlying cause, disease (pathology) is always the sin-
gle cause, and removal or attenuation of the disease
will result in a return to health. Evidence exists that all
three assumptions are wrong. We describe the
problems with current models and describe a new
model, derived from the World Health Organization’s
international classification of functioning framework,1 2
that provides a more comprehensive, less biologically
dependent account of illness.
Importance of models for understanding
illness
The model of illness adopted by society can have
important consequences. In the first world war, for
example, soldiers complaining of symptoms after
experiencing severe stresses were sometimes shot as
malingerers, but today they are considered victims and
eligible for financial settlements. Social acceptance that
a behaviour or reported symptom constitutes an illness
bestows privileges on an individual and formal duties
on society.3
Currently, most models of illness assume a causal
relation between disease and illness—the perceived
condition of poor health felt by an individual. Cultural
health beliefs and models of illness help determine the
perceived importance of symptoms and the subse-
quent use of medical resources.4 The assumption that a
specific disease underlies all illness has led to medicali-
sation of commonly experienced anomalous sensa-
tions and often disbelief of patients who present with
illness without any demonstrable disease process.
Current models of illness
Despite their importance, models of illness are rarely
explicitly discussed or defined. The often criticised but
nevertheless dominant 20th century biomedical
models originate from Virchow’s conclusion that all
disease results from cellular abnormalities.5 The
biomedical model is clearly relevant for many disease
based illnesses, has intuitive appeal, and is supported
by a wealth of supporting biological findings.
By embracing reductionism, however, biomedical
models of illness combine several closely related sets of
beliefs. These can be summarised as follows:
x All illness and all symptoms and signs arise from an
underlying abnormality within the body (usually in the
functioning or structure of specific organs), referred to
as a disease
x All diseases give rise to symptoms, eventually if not
initially, and although other factors may influence the
consequences of the disease, they are not related to its
development or manifestations
x Health is the absence of disease
x Mental phenomena, such as emotional disturbance
or delusions, are separate from and unrelated to other
disturbances of bodily function
x The patient is a victim of circumstance with little or
no responsibility for the presence or cause of the
illness3
x The patient is a passive recipient of treatment,
although cooperation with treatment is expected.
Many different models of illness exist, originating
in professions,w1 w2 specialties,w3 and elsewhere.w4 The
social model primarily focuses on the causation of dis-
ability by society rather than the whole spectrum of ill-
ness.6 The biopsychosocial model is perhaps the most
popular.7 w4 Over 400 Medline titles include the word,
and it is increasingly used in many areas of
medicine.w5-w8 In contrast to the biomedical model, it
recognises that psychological and social factors
influence a patient’s perceptions and actions and
therefore the experience of what it feels like to be ill.
References w1-w26 and a table detailing implications of the
model are on bmj.com
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Current problems
People often experience anomalous sensations.8 w9 The
model of illness adopted will influence whether a per-
son or their health adviser interprets a change in their
state as indicating disease,9 when someone should
enter and leave the sick role, and often the health care
given. Only a small minority of potential symptoms
lead to involvement with health care, but a small
change in the rate of interpreting anomalous
sensations as symptoms by any party will have a major
influence on the use of healthcare systems.
Being ill, and being allowed to enter the sick role,
has social and personal advantages for the person.3
Sick people may be absolved from social responsibili-
ties, they are not held responsible for their condition,
and they will often be eligible for healthcare benefits
for which they do not pay directly. The sick role is most
effective when it is validated by a doctor, but
increasingly other health and non-healthcare profes-
sionals contribute to validation; indeed, ill people can
now classify themselves as sick—for example, through
self completed incapacity benefit forms in the United
Kingdom.
Already many patients present with symptoms that
are not attributable to any underlying pathology or
disease.10 Nevertheless, such patients are often given a
medical diagnosis, implying an underlying structural
cause and reflecting cultural expectations.
Unfortunately, the use of diagnostic labels has
implications for the patient, society, and ultimately for
the credibility of medicine. Any illness provided with a
(medically validated) diagnostic label is widely assumed
to be secondary to defined pathology, to be capable of
confirmation independently of the symptoms, and to
have a specific treatment that health services should
supply.
The problems arising from illnesses without a
definable cause have been well documented.11 They are
most appropriately termed functional somatic syn-
dromes,12 w10 w11 recognising that psychological and
social factors strongly influence the presentation of
somatic symptoms.w12 However, suggesting that
patients do not have a disease (pathology) to explain
their illness may understandably upset them13 and cre-
ates difficulty for healthcare bureaucracy which relies
on the patient’s specific disease label.
Funding is determined by diagnosis (in health
related groups or similar) and ignores the initial cost
associated with diagnosis (patients present with
problems, not diagnoses). It also fails to recognise that
a major part of healthcare cost relates to disability.14
Resources are primarily allocated for the diagnosis and
specific treatment of disease. Little attention is paid to
other interventions despite good evidence of their
effectiveness. Examples include the provision of equip-
ment,w13 w14 the use of specialist multidisciplinary stroke
rehabilitation units,w15 and the altering of patients’
beliefs.w16 Most healthcare systems also assume that
treatment after diagnosis is brief and acts quickly.
Indeed, the medical model might more accurately be
termed the surgical model, given the pre-eminence of
surgery in popular culture and health organisation.
Finally, most biomedical models also seem strongly
linked to primitive forms of intuitive mind-body dual-
ism. Health commissioners, budgetary systems, health-
care professionals, and the public all act as if there is
some clear, inescapable separation between physical
and mental health problems, ignoring evidence that a
person’s emotional state always affects their function
and presentation of physical symptoms.w17 w18 For
example, separate services exist for people with physi-
cal disability and for those with mental health
problems.
New model
Two main factors fostered our new model. Firstly,
WHO’s international classification of impairment,
disability and handicapw19 and its later development, the
international classification of functioning, disability and
health,2 both recognise that disease has consequences at
different levels, often influenced by contextual factors.
Secondly, the power of a systems analytical approach to
illness has been recognised.7 15 w2 An earlier version of
this model formed the basis of the UK national
guidelines on stroke and multiple sclerosis.w20 w21
The main modifications to the international classi-
fication of functioning model are:
x A division of each main domain into a subjective
(patient experienced) and objective (externally
observed) component16
x The addition of a further human factor that is
essential in any analytical model—namely, the potential
contribution of free will and personal choice1
x A clarification of context, with separation of
personal and social contexts.
Our model (figure) suggests that illness is a
dysfunction of the person in his (or her) physical and
social environment. It is centred on the (ill) person,
who does not necessarily have to consider himself ill
(for example, if someone is deluded). The model
suggests that people with illness should be considered
as follows:
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x People have two major systems—their whole self,
with dysfunction termed impairment, and their organs,
with dysfunction called pathology
x Two influencing factors affect each person—
personal context (that is, beliefs, attitudes, expectations,
values etc, which derive partly from past experience)
and free will
x Each person interacts with two contexts—physical
and social or cultural
x The interactions are considered in term of activities
(which are usually goal directed actions) and (social)
participation (which reflects the meanings attributed to
their behaviours by themselves and others).
Implications of new model
This model has many implications (see table A on
bmj.com). One characteristic of a systems model is
that abnormalities in one system can occur without
any of its components being faulty, and so the model
explicitly predicts that illness will occur without
discernable pathology. The mystery of non-organic
or functional12 illness is no longer medically
unexplained.17 This analysis does not deny the reality
of the illness but rather provides the rationale and
support for explanations and treatments that direct
their focus to the non-medical reasons why people
may feel ill.
This model also predicts that the effects of an
abnormality may depend crucially on the characteris-
tics of other parts of the system. For example, hip
arthritis may become apparent only after a stroke
affects the other leg. Consequently, reduction of illness
may require intervention at several points, and indeed
may not necessarily include removal of the main
abnormality; this may explain the success of specialised
stroke rehabilitation.w15
The model suggests that some resources should be
focused on altering contextual factors. Evidence
already supports this approach: teaching carers of
stroke patients benefits both the patient and healthcare
systemsw22 w23; changing social contextw24 may be
effective—for example, reducing time off work with
back painw25; altering personal context may help in
some illnessesw26—for example, using cognitive behav-
iour therapyw16; and improving the physical context
reduces expenditure on health care.w13
The role of personal choice, absent in many
biomedical models of illness,18 is central to any
progressive explanation of human behaviour: “People
are rational, aware self creating agents of their own
health . . . influenced by consciously chosen goals.”19
Personal choice plays an important part in the genesis
or maintenance of illness, particularly in and through
the domain of activities.
This model also illuminates some of the current
stresses within health care and illness related benefits
systems. Systems focused on pathology (that is,
hospitals) work in short time scales and ignore all
patient context. However, they have to manage patients
with activity limitations, in whom the time scale is
longer and context is important. A coherent approach
to rehabilitation inevitably requires action from other
agencies such as social, housing, or employment
services. When the characteristics (speed of priorities,
available interventions) across organisational bounda-
ries do not match each other or the needs of the
patient, stresses may arise (often referred to as bed
blocking in hospital).
Conclusion
The new model undoubtedly has several weaknesses
but it strives to provide a fuller understanding of the
factors involved in illness at the level of both the
Example case
A 54 year old man who had a stroke eight months ago.
He still has some weakness in his left leg and
clumsiness in his left arm. He has not returned to his
work in a hospital finance department and is
depressed and irritable. His condition can be
considered in the following domains:
Pathology
Objective (medical) description—Mild stroke (right lacunar
infarct) due to hypertensive vascular disease, with
incidental osteoarthritis of the right hip
Subjective (patient’s) description—Severe stroke
Impairment
Objective description—Mild clumsiness of the
non-dominant left hand with slight weakness of the
left leg and mild hip pain. Cognition is normal
Subjective description—Left arm is useless and the left
leg is weak and unreliable
Activities
Objective description—Good recovery of personal
activities and has the ability to do most activities if he
wishes
Subjective description—Still feels severely disabled,
unable to garden, fish, or work or to shop alone
Participation
Objective description—He has returned to being a father
and husband and a few roles within family and close
friends.
Subjective description—Still feels a patient, unable to
fulfil any roles well
Personal context
His expectation was for a full recovery; he is still afraid
that any stress will cause a second stroke; he believes
that work and anything outside the house is stressful;
he wants more treatment to cure him
Social context
His wife and friends tell him to take it easy and offer to
do anything to help, including paying for private
therapy once a week. They want him to get a disabled
badge and are angry that it is not given. His employers
want him signed off as fully fit and to return to work
full time
Physical context
He can access all parts of his house and wear and use
normal things. Work is also accessible.
The primary problem here is a disjunction between
the view of the healthcare system and the view of the
patient and his immediate friends and family. The best
solution is to take time to educate him and his family,
to help his self confidence in community activities, to
help him back to driving his car, and to persuade his
employers to take him back on a planned and agreed
graduated basis over several months. Therapy as such
should not be given because it reinforces the patient
role. His mood disturbance is secondary to his loss of
roles.
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individual and healthcare systems (box). The model
could also be applied outside the health arena—for
example, to people in the criminal justice system.1
Healthcare systems are social organisations, and
their continuing health depends on members of
society using a congruent model of illness and system
of values to decide the rights and responsibilities asso-
ciated with illness and the sick role, and how these are
to be policed where individuals choose to take
advantage of the role. We suggest that the use of our
model might improve the delivery of better health
more than any other change in healthcare organisa-
tion. It is time that the medical models underpinning
health delivery were debated openly.
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Summary points
Traditional biomedical models of illness focus
attention on discovering the pathology rather
than understanding the illness
Biomedical models have been associated with
huge improvement in medical care
They do not explain functional somatic
syndromes and illness without discernable
disease.
An expanded model of illness is proposed
which emphasises that disease is only one
factor contributing to illness and illness
behaviour
Widespread adoption could facilitate
improvement in delivery of health care and
reduce incapacity for work
A memorable patient
In at the deep end
11 am, 8 August 1998—a date that I shall never forget. It was the
day after I had landed in Nairobi, Kenya, where I was to spend my
elective. The telephone in my room woke me up. It was my
supervising doctor. “There has been a bomb blast at the US
embassy in town, we need everyone medically trained in casualty
now.” With that he hung up.
“I’m not due to start my elective for another week,” I thought to
myself as I rushed to the hospital. “Nor am I medically trained,” I
panicked as I entered the hospital grounds. The image that
greeted me still haunts me. There were bodies scattered
everywhere, and scores more people were being rushed to the
hospital by any mode of transport. Most victims had burns or
extensive lacerations caused by bomb shrapnel and the falling
glass from the surrounding buildings.
In the face of indescribable terror, pain, confusion, and grief, I
was expected to treat patients completely unsupervised. “Do
whatever you can,” barked my supervisor, struggling to stem
torrential blood flow from someone’s neck. It was then that I saw
a young boy sitting timidly in a corner. His face and once pristine
white school shirt were drenched in blood. Examination revealed
an 8 cm forehead laceration. All the theatres were full, so I had to
suture this large laceration under local anaesthetic. Amazingly
this stoic 6 year old didn’t even whimper once. He subsequently
attached himself to me and shadowed me wherever I went in the
casualty department. It wasn’t until his petrified parents came into
the department searching for him that he started crying. He gave
me a big hug and left with his very relieved parents. He was one
of the lucky ones—the death toll from that abominable incident
was substantial.
On a beautiful tranquil day several weeks later the boy came
into the casualty department accompanied by his parents. They
had come to thank me for looking after their only child. The scar
was slightly uneven but had otherwise healed well. I couldn’t help
but feel proud of my first postoperative result.
We exchanged email addresses, and I regularly receive
correspondence from the boy and his family. His most recent
email disclosed that he had started dating a girl. She is his first
ever girlfriend—apparently she loves his scar.
Apul Parikh plastic surgery registrar, Royal Free Hospital, London
(apulparikh@yahoo.com), Amit Parikh Burnley General Hospital
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